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REGIONAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
JED ODERMATT
City Law School, City, University of London
[A] INTRODUCTION
International law is often presented as a universal system that applies
in the same way across different countries and regions of the world, yet,
in recent years, this view has increasingly come under challenge. Different
regions and countries, especially outside the West, have developed
practices and views towards international law that show that international
law is perceived and practised differently in different parts of the world.
The rise of countries outside the West, particularly Brazil, Russia, India,
China and South Africa (BRICS), has also shown these countries to be
more assertive on the international stage, including on issues of public
international law. The idea of ‘comparative international law’ has also
received more academic attention in the literature (Roberts et al 2018).
The book Is International Law International? (Roberts 2017), for instance,
challenges the concept that there is one view of international law,
demonstrating how different regions have developed diverging
understandings of international law. The phenomenon of regional
approaches to international law is not new, however, and the different
approaches taken towards international law can often be explained by
looking at issues such as the region’s history, politics, religion and
economic development.
The theme of regional approaches to international law was the subject
of a workshop held on 3 July 2019 at City Law School, University of
London.1 The need to understand the historical, political and economic
reasons that drive regional approaches to international law emerged as
one of the key themes. Lauri Mälksoo, University of Tartu, discussed his
research on Russian approaches to international law (Mälksoo 2015).
1 The workshop was part of the GLOBALLAW@CITY Research Dialogue Series. For a report on
the series, see Fahey et al (2019).
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These have developed both at the level of the Russian government, as well
as in Russian scholarship. Professor Mälksoo discussed the implications
of Russian approaches to international law for the claimed universality of
the field in Europe and globally, and whether comparative perspectives
can be drawn for the study of international law generally. Wim Muller,
University of Maastricht, discussed the concept of ‘International Law with
Chinese Characteristics’, a title that refers to the concept of ‘socialism
with Chinese characteristics’ used by the People’s Republic of China
(PRC). Just as socialism is to be adapted to the social and economic
conditions of China, international law may also undergo a similar change,
whereby international law is adapted to suit the situation of China. Muller
discussed how, with China’s economic rise, there has also been a more
assertive attitude towards international law, but that this assertiveness
is sometimes curtailed by China’s historic experience with international
law. Mauro Barelli, City Law School, continued with this theme in ‘China
and the Responsibility to Protect’. Although China has asserted that
sovereignty is a central part of its foreign policy, Chinese policy has shown
to be more pragmatic and influenced by developments in international
politics. This is an example of a common theme in the debate: what is the
relationship between rhetoric about international law, both in academia
and official statements, and the practice of international law, and how do
they shape each other?
Russian Approaches to International Law
Lauri Mälksoo began with the complex question as to whether there was,
or could ever be, a discipline labelled as ‘comparative international law’?
Anthea Roberts ignited a significant debate on this topic, examining its
subject contours, content and intellectual limits. Mälksoo asked whether
there are truly regional approaches to public international law. Moreover,
he asks, where did this question come from? Those studying international
law have always known of different approaches to international law, such
as the approaches of dualism and monism, but they did not appear to be
important enough to challenge the universality of the established shared
European vision. The interest in regional approaches, Mälksoo argues,
comes with the relative rise of powers outside the West.
Mälksoo reflected on how his study of Russian approaches to
international law has been informed by his personal experience living in
Estonia during the breakup of the Soviet Union and after. Having lived
through different political discourses and regimes, this awakened his
sense for the relativity of things and allowed him to notice the ideology
behind the law. For instance, human rights were viewed in the West
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(relatively recently) as of primary importance, whereas in Russia, there
were other values that were of importance. Was there something in the
Russian, Eastern European or the Orthodox world that made the reality
of international law different? Mälksoo points out that in Russia
(communist and post-communist), political discourse and literature spoke
a lot about international law, but that it was predominantly used as a
political weapon, particularly against the West. When Western states
criticised the Soviet Union for a lack of respect for human rights or
democracy, it could respond by arguing that it was in fact Western
countries that were violating those principles.
Mälksoo also discussed the importance of language in the study of
international law. In the past, European international lawyers were
expected to speak English and French, perhaps also German or Italian.
Today, international law scholarship in the West is predominantly in
English, and the principal journal of international law, the American
Journal of International Law, publishes articles that do not include non-
English language sources. Even the challengers to the Anglo-Saxon
tradition, the German scholars, publish largely in English, he argued.
Mälksoo argued that the same could not be said of discourse on
international law outside the West. There are entire debates and discourse
on international law in languages other than English. Mälksoo also
commented on the phenomenon of different academic accents when
writing in different languages. A Russian scholar may feel comfortable
writing things in Russian for a Russian audience that they would not write
for a wider audience, in English.
So what is a Russian approach to international law? Mälksoo noted
that, for the most part, public international law has not been universal;
in the 19th and early 20th centuries, it was used to govern ‘civilised
nations’. Russia sat in an awkward position. It saw itself as the Eastern-
most country of the ‘civilised nations’, but was also told by Western states
that it was not civilised. Such disjuncture, sitting in between traditions,
can also be seen in the development of the Chinese approach to
international law, discussed below.
Mälksoo discussed how domestic concepts of law can influence
approaches to public international law. Mälksoo notes a paradox in the
way that international law is viewed. On the one hand, Russia argued
that, in its tradition, it would rather regulate without law, a view informed
by the legal nihilism in Russian and Orthodox tradition. On the other
hand, Russia saw itself as a protector of international law in its
international relations. Mälksoo notes how the Russian tradition is not a
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rejection of international law, but more an emphasis on certain principles.
The UN Charter, for instance, starts with the principles of the non-use of
force and the principle of non-intervention. While the emphasis on human
rights and democratic legitimacy increased in the West, nothing had
changed the central importance of state sovereignty. Indeed, such
Western interventionism could be viewed as a violation of international
law. Mälksoo finds this ‘clash’ of visions to be related to underlying
differences in political philosophy. Similar to the Chinese approach,
discussed below, Russia not only emphasises the importance of
sovereignty, it views it as a core value of international law.
Another related feature of the Russian approach was a certain distrust
towards international adjudication. While supporting public international
law in its ‘propaganda’, Mälksoo shows how Russia was reluctant to
utilise international dispute settlement bodies, especially to resolve legal
disputes with post-Soviet states. As an example, he discussed how in the
Alabama arbitration, the United States and the United Kingdom shared
the same language and religion and could ‘trust’ one another. The same
could not be said of Russia, which looked at the imperialists as the enemy,
and which had a different concept of what international law is.
Mälksoo makes an interesting parallel between the United Kingdom and
Russia regarding the relationship with its former colonies. Diverging
approaches to international law can be seen, and are most acute, when
empires disintegrate and there remains a phantom understanding of the
spheres of influence. In both situations, countries became independent,
but the former empire was not willing to accept them as de facto fully
sovereign. Today Moscow views the former empire in these terms: they
are separate, but not foreign countries. The same approach is taken by
the United Kingdom, which, although it recognises the compulsory
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, has made a reservation
regarding disputes with current or former members of the
Commonwealth. In this post-imperial experience, there appears to be a
disjuncture between the law and reality, one where public international
law may apply in theory, but has no connection with reality. According to
the maps, and to public international law, Transnistria, South Ossetia,
and Crimea are not part of Russia, but this does not accord with the
reality on the ground, and will not likely change in the near future.
Chinese Approaches to International Law
Wim Muller highlighted the need to understand history in international
law. Lawyers tend to think of international law as universal and
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unchanging, Muller argues, especially if they have only had training in
law. This does not fit with reality, and there is a tension in international
law between universality and regional variation. Looking at history, and
regional approaches to international law, also helps us understand the
deeper function of public international law in international society. As
discussed by Mälksoo, one should look at the links between approaches
to law and political philosophy, and the question of what goals
international law sets out to achieve. International law can be limited to
the relations between states and resolving inter-state disputes, but it can
also take multiple other forms, including one that deals with rights of
individuals. Studying regional approaches thus allows us to understand
these different views about the underlying purpose of international law.
Muller emphasised the need to understand the role of Chinese history
in the development of a Chinese approach to international law. The
modern international legal system is not indigenous to China and had a
disruptive effect when it was introduced. China historically viewed itself
as the centre of an empire and a world order. Such perception was
challenged up the invasion of foreign powers. International law was
further used to open up China, for instance, when the British used
international law arguments to sell opium in China (although not a correct
reading of international law at the time). The League of Nations did little
to prevent the Japanese invasion of China. Such treatment was indicative
of the century of defeat and humiliation suffered by China. Such feelings
of distrust towards international law, based in feelings of humiliation,
continued after the end of the Second World War, when China was invited
to be a member of the UN Security Council (UNSC), but the PRC did not
take up the seat until 1971. Such non-participation at the UNSC
furthered this narrative of humiliation.
China itself was also undergoing a turbulent period. When the PRC
replaced the Republic of China (ROC) in 1971, its foreign policy also
changed. During this period, China accepted the international legal order
and would seek to achieve its aims within that order. Its foreign policy
identified three core interests: territorial sovereignty, regional security,
and development. Since 1989, the foreign policy goals of China evolved
further. China undertook market reforms in service of its development in
the 1990s, and the fruit of such change was seen in the 2000s. China
sought to assuage concerns about the ‘rise of China’ by coining the term
‘peaceful rise’, emphasising that Chinese economic development would
not lead to it becoming a military or other threat. The 1989 Tiananmen
incident also put the issue of human rights on the agenda, as the world
community had concerns about human rights and democracy in China.
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Until 2010 China pursued these three ‘modest’ goals and did not want to
be seen as an aggressive power.
Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, China has found itself becoming
more ambitious and assertive on the world stage. Such global ambition has
called into question its traditional foreign policy and its place in the
international legal order. China’s foreign policy priorities, moreover, are
reflected in its approach to the international legal order. First, it seeks to
adhere to the principles in the Charter of the United Nations, of which
sovereignty is viewed as an overarching value. China’s five principles of co-
existence, which were included in a peace treaty with India, are presented
as one of China’s main contributions to public international law. These
principles include the respect for territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-
interference in the internal affairs of other states, and the principle of
equality and mutual benefit. Muller reminds us that such importance
placed on state sovereignty is linked to China’s history. From a Chinese
perspective, sovereignty is the main foundation of international law, and
as Wang Tieya (1990: 290) argues ‘a legal barrier protecting against foreign
domination and aggression’.2 Moreover, as Xue Hanqin (2011), now judge
of the International Court of Justice, has argued, there is also an important
cultural dimension. International law is a relatively new system for China,
compared to European states. Muller argues in this vein that for China
international law is not as familiar as it is in Western Europe. China’s
emphasis on state sovereignty can also be seen as connected to other
approaches to international law, such as the Soviet approach, or the Third
World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) approach with its emphasis
on colonial history. While China takes this position on sovereignty, its
practice is sometimes more pragmatic than expected, Muller argues.
Since around 2014, China no longer has a ‘modest’ approach to
international law and has sought to challenge the interpretation of norms
or shape international law. The Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th
Communist Party of China Central Committee (2014) Outcome Document
states that China will:
vigorously participate in the formulation of international norms,
promote the handling of foreign-related economic and social affairs
according to the law, strengthen our country’s discourse power and
2 Wang Tieya developed his point thus (1990: 290): ‘The PRC sticks to the doctrine of sovereignty
not only because China has bitter experiences of its sovereignty being ruthlessly encroached upon
by foreign powers in the past, but that it also has the conviction that the principle of sovereignty is
the only main foundation upon which international relations and international law can be
established and developed. The Chinese put emphasis on sovereignty because it is the hard-worn
prize of their long struggles for their lost sovereignty. They take sovereignty as a legal barrier
protecting against foreign domination and aggression.’
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influence in international affairs, use legal methods to safeguard our
country’s sovereignty, security and development interests.
(Communist Party of China Central Committee 2014)
The development of the law is thus at the centre of Chinese Communist
Party policy. While China seeks to be a shaper of international norms, the
way in which this occurs is subtle, and is beginning to unfold. There are
a number of areas where China seeks to shape international law. In the
area of human rights, for instance, China accepts the universal character
of human rights, but asserts that the way they are interpreted and applied
must take into account history, culture, and the specific circumstances
of the country. China assumes that the interpretative authority of human
rights is biased in favour of Western cultures.
Another area of engagement has been in the South China Sea
arbitration. The Philippines brought the case before an arbitral tribunal,
as both states are party to the United Nations Convention for the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS). Although China challenged the jurisdiction of the
tribunal, it was not confident enough to make these arguments before the
tribunal itself, and declined to participate in the proceedings. For Muller,
this was a strategic error on the part of China. It also puts China in the
same group as other major powers such as the United States and Russia,
which have refused to appear before international dispute settlement
bodies. China is different, Muller argues, as China remains insecure
about how to use international law arguments. As China is viewed as a
rising power, it may appear strange that China is not confident enough
to assert its legal position. This is an example, Muller argues, of how
China’s unfamiliarity with international law still plays a role and shapes
the ability of China to use international law.
China also seeks to be a power and shaper of international norms in
the field of cybersecurity. China argues that ‘cyber sovereignty’ should be
a guiding principle regulating cyberspace. So far, such view has gained
little traction, although some states, including Russia, align with this
position. This is an example, Muller argues, of an emerging gap between
Western and non-Western states.
China and the Responsibility to Protect
Barelli continued with the discussion of Chinese approaches to
international law by focusing on China’s approach to one debate in
particular: the responsibility to protect (Barelli 2018). The contemporary
debate in international law about the responsibility to protect doctrine
(R2P) has forced China to confront its traditional opposition to
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intervention and intrusions into state sovereignty. While conducting
research on the use of force, and in particular on humanitarian
intervention, Barelli became interested in the idea about how different
regions, and states, have very different understandings and
interpretations of international law, and the development of the R2P
principle is a case in point.
In essence, the principle of R2P means that when a state allows or
commits atrocities against its people, the responsibility to protect these
people can shift from the state to the international community. This, of
course, is a question that goes to the very heart of sovereignty. Barelli
points out that China was recently criticised for failing to live up to its
responsibility, as a permanent UN Security Council member, to resolve
the unfolding crisis in Syria. While China called for a political resolution
to the crisis, it vetoed any UN resolution that would impose sanctions, or
allow the use of force, against Syria.
This presents a potential dilemma for China. China has an interest in
maintaining the principle of respect for sovereignty, the non-use of force,
and non-intervention. It is often used as a ‘shield’ against criticism of
China, as it views such criticism as ‘meddling’ in its internal affairs and
an affront to its sovereignty. At the same time, however, as China has
become a military and economic power, it has interests in maintaining
international stability, as its continued prosperity and economic growth
are tied to peace and stability. How, then, has China sought to reconcile
these differences?
While R2P is recognised as a principle—it is a ‘guiding principle’, rather
than a rule, Barelli argues—there remains uncertainty about how it
applies and under which circumstances. It is emerging as a recognised
tool to shape the international response to atrocities, but the precise
contours have not been shaped. It is still viewed as an exception. It
recognises that the international community should do ‘something’, but
there are different conceptions of what this entails. R2P is understood as
comprising three main pillars. The first, and least controversial, is that
states have the primary responsibility to protect their population against
atrocity crimes—genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes
against humanity. According to the second pillar, in cases where the state
does not, or cannot protect its population, the international community
may intervene peacefully to assist a state. This includes diplomatic and
other support, or the use of peacekeeping, with the consent of the state.
Like the first pillar, China views this as being in accordance with the
principle of state sovereignty, since intervention can only take place with
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the consent of the state. The third pillar, on the other hand, means that,
if the circumstances require, the international community should be
willing to take coercive measures, including military intervention. In order
for such measures to be compatible with the R2P principle, they must be
authorised by the UN Security Council.
Rather than outright rejecting the validity of the third pillar, China has
sought to engage with it. When discussions on R2P took place in
international forums, including the UN Security Council, China actively
took part in the process. This is an example, as discussed by Muller, of
China moving from a ‘rule-taker’ to a ‘rule-maker’, as China sought to
shape the emergence of a new principle. How did it do so? First, it sought
to limit as much as possible the circumstances that would trigger the
third pillar. It also endorsed the so-called sequential approach under
which military intervention would only be considered once all other
options had been tried. Such an approach, however, was not accepted by
the international community, and a report of the UN Secretary General
argued against such an interpretation. China has consistently argued that
every effort should be made to resolve the crisis with consent of the state
involved, but it has not ruled out the use of intervention authorised by
the UN Security Council. The position of China is that it supports R2P,
but only as long as it does not challenge state sovereignty. Clearly, there
is a contradiction in such an approach, as R2P challenges unlimited state
sovereignty by its nature.
Barelli argues that it is important to also look at the practice of China,
rather than focusing on rhetoric and official statements. Here, a more
pragmatic picture emerges. On some occasions, China has shown a
willingness to support R2P, such as in the case of Libya. While China
supported sanctions against Libya and the referral of the situation to the
International Criminal Court, it abstained on a resolution authorising the
use of force. In this case, China did not object to the use of force in
response to a humanitarian crisis.
It is understandable, Barelli argues, that China would take such an
ambivalent position. China cannot take action, either rhetorically or in
practice, that expressly undermines its commitment to the principle of
state sovereignty. However, the practice of China, including the use of
peacekeepers and implicit support of R2P operations, is beginning to
challenge this. Interestingly, states in the Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) have taken a position very similar to China as far as
understanding the concept of R2P goes (e.g., support of pillars 1 and 2,
and reluctance to accept pillar 3). Yet, ASEAN states have not taken the
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same approach taken by China on the ground (also because of China’s
privileged position as one of the UNSC). This shows how different states
and regions can take different approaches to international law, but also
that such approaches are ultimately guided by political considerations.
Slowly, China has begun to align itself with the position taken by a
majority of other states, showing that its principled support of state
sovereignty can also be mediated by politics.
[B] CONCLUSION
A number of key issues emerged from the debate. All the speakers
emphasised the importance of looking to history in understanding how
regional approaches emerge, and how they continue to influence the way
states approach international law. Moreover, it is important to look at
both the rhetoric—what academics and government statements say about
international law—and the actual practice of states. While Russian and
Chinese approaches emphasise the importance of sovereignty as an
underlying value of international law, the practice of those states shows
a more complex story. Regional approaches to international law tend to
show a different emphasis or accent on certain values or principles
(sovereignty, human rights, international adjudication), but they have not
presented a fundamental challenge to those norms as such. At what point
do such different conceptions of international law move from regional
variation, to be expected in a decentralised legal order, to regional
fragmentation?
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